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Early warning systems (EWS) are widely used for assessing countries’ vulnerability to fiscal distress. A 
fiscal distress episode is identified as a period when government experiences extreme funding 
difficulties. Most EWS employ a specific set of only fiscal leading indicators predetermined by the 
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indicators offers a 29% gain in predictive power compared to a traditional one based on fiscal leading 
indicators only. This suggests that both fiscal and non-fiscal leading indicators should be taken into 
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I. Introduction 
The global financial crisis and the subsequent weakening of fiscal positions in advanced and 
emerging economies once again underscored the importance of monitoring country’s 
vulnerability to fiscal distress. A fiscal distress episode is identified as a period when government 
experiences extreme funding difficulties, which can manifest through outright default or 
restructuring, bond yield pressure, a large IMF-supported program or excessive inflation. What 
variables should policymakers watch to assess fiscal risks? There is a large empirical literature by 
now attempting to answer this question using Early Warning Systems (EWS). International 
financial organizations, central banks, rating agencies and other organizations draw on these 
studies to develop indicators of vulnerability to fiscal distress. 
Most of the existing EWS have the following characteristics (see Abiad, 2003 for a survey). First, 
they use a predetermined set of leading indicators to assess country’s vulnerability to fiscal 
distress, which are typically based on economic reasoning. Second, the list of these variables 
varies widely across studies, in part driven by the preference of the researchers for parsimonious 
models with a large number of significant leading indicators. Finally, the results from the studies 
are mixed, with no agreement as to which leading indicators are most robustly associated with 
fiscal distress. A key characteristic of a robust leading indicator is that its coefficient’s sign does 
not depend on the model specification. 
The purpose of this paper is to revisit the issue of leading indicators of fiscal distress by using the 
Extreme Bound Analysis (EBA). The main advantage of this methodology is that it takes an 
agnostic approach with respect to leading indicators of fiscal distress and does not require the 
researcher to predetermine the set of explanatory variables. Instead, it “allows the data to speak” 
and ranks a set of possible leading indicators based on the “robustness” of their association with 
fiscal distress. This methodology was used in other fields of economics, notably, growth theory 
(see for example Sala-i-Martín, 1997) and only recently was applied to analyze financial crises, for 
example by Ho (2010). However, to our best knowledge we are the first to apply it for analyzing 
fiscal distress. 
Our analysis leads to the following conclusions. First, both fiscal and non-fiscal leading indicators 
are robustly associated with fiscal distress. This is in contrast to traditional measures of fiscal 
stress based on fiscal leading indicators (Baldacci et al., 2011). Second, a vulnerability index based 
on these robust indicators has a performance comparable to the average of performance of 
other EWS (for fiscal, currency, banking, and other types of crises) in the literature. However, it 
has better predictive power than the EWS of Baldacci et al. (2011), which is based on only fiscal 
leading indicators. Finally, the main result on the importance of both fiscal and non-fiscal leading 
indicators for fiscal distress is robust to various model specifications and sample compositions. 
The policy implication is that policymakers should not restrict their attention to fiscal indicators 
only when assessing country’s vulnerability to fiscal distress. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 surveys the related literature. 
Section 3 describes the empirical methodology and data. Section 4 presents the estimation 
results using EBA and conducts robustness checks. Section 5 develops an indicator of fiscal 
distress based on most robust leading indicators identified using EBA and assesses its predictive 
power. The final section concludes.  
II. Related Literature 
A. Theories of Crisis Determinants 
When modeling crises, it is important to draw distinction between underlying vulnerabilities and 
crisis risks. The presence of underlying vulnerabilities is a necessary precondition for a crisis to 
occur, but not sufficient. Crises tend to be triggered by external or domestic shocks, which are 
highly uncertain. The underlying vulnerability helps to identify countries that are prone to crisis 
should even a moderate shock occur. 
The early theoretical literature emphasized the role of fundamentals in measuring underlying 
vulnerability. The classic reference is Krugman (1979), which predicts that weak fundamentals, in 
part driven by unsustainable fiscal and monetary policies, make countries vulnerable to a balance 
of payments crisis. For fiscal crises, Detragiache and Spilimbergo (2001) show that sovereign 
default is the only equilibrium response to a large negative shock to fundamentals. 
The following generation of theoretical literature of crises emphasizes the role of self-fulfilling 
expectations and non-fiscal fundamentals. The self-fulfilling crisis literature (Obstfeld, 1984; 
Calvo, 1988; Alesina et al., 1989; Cole and Kehoe, 1994; Jeanne, 1997; and Masson, 1999) was 
inspired by the fact that while some crises were preceded by deterioration in fundamentals, some 
speculative attacks have taken place without apparent monetary and fiscal imbalances. These 
studies developed multiple-equilibrium models, which allow better capturing the complex 
interaction between underlying vulnerabilities and speculative attacks (Eichengreen et al., 
1995 provide a review). In these models, countries can jump from good to bad equilibrium for a 
certain range of values of economic fundamentals. For example, Calvo (1988) shows that if a 
government is unable to commit to repay its debt, multiple equilibria, including repudiation and 
inflation, can arise. 
The main takeaway from the review of theoretical literature is that there is no a priori reason to 
restrict leading indicators of fiscal distress to fiscal fundamentals.  
B. Empirical Evidence on Early Warning Indicators of Fiscal Distress 
The empirical literature on early warning indicators of fiscal distress was developed as part of a 
larger literature on early warning indicators of financial crises. Comprehensive surveys of EWS for 
banking, currency, sovereign debt, equity, and inflation crises can be found in Kaminsky et al. 
(1998), Hawkins and Klaw (2000), Abiad (2003), Berg et al. (2005), and Frankel and Saravelos 
(2012). As discussed above, the main objective of these studies is to identify leading indicators 
making countries vulnerable to a crisis, rather than prediction of the timing of the crisis. The 
empirical techniques used in this literature could be grouped into two main categories: non-
parametric and parametric (Hemming et al., 2003; Baldacci et al., 2011; Frankel and Saravelos, 
2012; and Comelli, 2013).5  
The most popular non-parametric EWS is the “signals” approach popularized by Kaminsky et al. 
(1998) in the context of currency crises. This approach selects a number of variables as leading 
indicators of crises and determines threshold values beyond which a crisis signal is considered to 
have been given. The main drawback of this approach is that it only focuses on bivariate 
association between an early warning indicator and crises and does not allow controlling for 
other factors. Also, the statistical significance of the early warning indicators cannot be 
determined directly, although out-of-sample performance could be assessed. Studies using these 
techniques in the context of fiscal crises include Reinhart (2002), Hemming et al. (2003), Baldacci 
et al (2011), Berti et al. (2012) and de Cos et al. (2014). These studies suggest that fiscal 
fundamentals, such as the level of public debt and its composition, fiscal deficit, fiscal financing 
needs, are important leading indicators of fiscal distress.  
The parametric EWS models draw on limited dependent variable techniques (multivariate logit, 
probit). These methods allow testing the significance of various leading indicators in determining 
the likelihood of crisis occurring in the near future, while accounting for their correlation. 
However, these methods require long-time series of leading indicators and low degrees of 
freedom that may prevent the use of multivariate approach when the number of predictors is 
large. Studies that applied parametric methods to analyze fiscal crises include Marashaden 
(1997), Peter (2002), Manasse et al. (2003), Kraay and Nehru (2006), and Gourinchas and 
Obstfeld (2012). These studies confirm the importance of fiscal fundamentals, but suggest that 
macroeconomic developments in general, especially in the external sector, also play a role. 
Both groups of studies share a common characteristic – the set of leading indicators of fiscal 
distress is predetermined by the researcher. This selection is typically done with the benefit of 
hindsight, with the significance of the leading indicator typically playing a role in the selection 
process.6 To overcome this issue, some recent studies applied the extreme bound methodology 
to study leading indicators of financial crises. 
C. Extreme Bound Methodology 
The extreme bound methodology was developed and applied to study determinants of growth 
by Leamer (1978), and was later on extended and popularized by Sala-i-Martin (1997). The 
methodology does not rely on a predetermined set of explanatory variables and “lets the data 
                                                          
5 Some studies have also applied relatively less standard techniques, such as binary recursive tress, artificial 
neutral networks, and Markov switching models. 
6 In the meta-analysis literature, this phenomenon is often referred to as “publication bias”. 
speak” by examining all possible combinations of explanatory variables. The focus is on the 
change in signs of explanatory variables. If a sign change is observed relatively frequently, the 
explanatory variable is said not robustly related to the dependent variable. 
Early warning studies using the extreme bound methodology (or its Bayesian equivalent) include 
Chakrabarti and Zeaiter (2014), Ho (2014), and Christofides et al. (2015). However, to our best 
knowledge no study used this approach to analyze determinants of fiscal distress, which is the 
gap we would like to fill in our paper. The closest paper to ours is Chakrabarti and Zeaiter (2014), 
which analyzes determinants of external debt arrears using a linear regression model. The results 
suggest that a range of fiscal and non-fiscal indicators, including growth, inflation, trade deficit, 
foreign reserves, and exchange rate, are robust predictors of external debt arrears. 
Alessi et al. (2015) provide an overview of alternative ways of combining the information in a 
large set of variables such as the Lasso, the ridge regression estimator, Bayesian Model 
Averaging, principal component analysis  or factor models. However, the advantages of the 
Extreme Bound Analysis are that it does not introduce an estimation bias such as the Lasso or the 
ridge regression. Furthermore, its data requirements are less strict than for Bayesian Model 
Averaging as it can be applied to unbalanced panels and the results are more directly 
interpretable than the ones stemming from principal component or factor models.   
III. Empirical Methodology and Data 
A. Empirical Methodology: Extreme Bound Analysis 
As discussed above, Extreme Bound Analysis (EBA) is an agnostic approach to identify 
explanatory variables that are robustly associated with an outcome variable. Instead of pre-
selecting a small set of explanatory variables, EBA explores a large number of combinations from 
a pool of variables used in the previous literature and based on theoretical considerations.  
In the context of an Early Warning System (EWS) for fiscal distress events, the following logit 
specification is estimated: 
𝒍𝒍𝒍�
𝑷[𝒀 = 𝟏|𝒛,𝒙]
𝑷[𝒀 = 𝟎|𝒛,𝒙]� = 𝜷𝒛𝒛𝒛 + 𝜷𝒙𝒛𝒙𝒛 + 𝜺                                                                                  (1)  
Where Y is a binary outcome variable indicating a fiscal distress event, z is the leading indicator 
whose robustness is to be assessed and 𝑥𝑗 are other leading indicators from the pool of all 
leading indicators excluding z. Assume there are n elements in this pool. Then, for each leading 
indicator z, one has to estimate a regression with k additional controls 𝑥𝑗, which gives 𝑀 =(𝑛−1−𝑘)!
𝑘!  combinations per leading indicator z and a total of 𝑛𝑀 regressions to be estimated.  
For each leading indicator z, we follow the following procedure:  
• Estimate each of the 𝑀 regressions and store the estimated coefficient of z, ?̂?𝑧𝑗 . 
• Weigh coefficients ?̂?𝑧𝑗 by the relative likelihood of the model, which they are a part of, so 
that coefficients stemming from a very unlikely model receive less weight than others. 
The weight is: 
𝝎𝒛𝒛 = 𝑳𝒛𝒛∑ 𝑳𝒛𝒛𝑴𝒛=𝟏                                                                                                                                  (2) 
• Calculate the weighted average of coefficients across regressions to obtain the coefficient 
of leading indicator z: 
𝜷𝒛� = �𝝎𝒛𝒛𝑴
𝒛=𝟏
𝜷𝒛𝒛                                                                                                                               (3) 
• Calculate a likelihood-weighted average standard error in a similar fashion.  
• Assess the robustness of 𝛽𝑧�. Assuming that 𝛽𝑧� is normally distributed across regressions, 
calculate the proportion of its distribution to one side of zero, and consider 𝛽𝑧� to be 
robust if this proportion exceeds a certain confidence level (e.g. 90 percent).  
Following these steps for each indicator results in a set of indicators which can be ranked 
according to their respective robustness. 
B. Data 
Our dataset covers 29 advanced and 52 emerging economies (81 countries in total) over the 
period 1970–2015. It builds on the original dataset of fiscal distress developed by Baldacci et al. 
(2011), extending the data through 2015 and expanding the set of leading indicators. 
Fiscal distress 
A fiscal distress episode is identified as a period when government experiences extreme funding 
difficulties. Based on the literature survey, Baldacci et al. (2011) identify four types of criteria to 
capture fiscal distress episodes: (i) debt default or restructuring; (ii) sovereign bond yield 
pressure; (iii) large IMF-supported program; and (iv) excessive inflation. We adopt the same 
definition of fiscal distress (see Table 1) and expand the series through 2015. 
Table 2 presents the distribution of fiscal distress episodes across their types and country groups. 
Several observations emerge. First, comparison across country groups suggests that advanced 
economies have experienced fewer fiscal distress episodes compared to emerging economies. 
The low unconditional likelihood of fiscal distress for advanced economies will have implications 
for the conditional analysis conducted below. Second, the comparison across types of distress 
events suggests that advanced economies experienced almost no outright default episodes and 
most fiscal distress episodes were manifested in the form of bond yield pressures. By contrast, 
emerging economies experienced a large number of fiscal distress episodes and were frequent 
recipients of large IMF-supported bailouts. Finally, the total number of distress episodes is lower 
than the sum of individual episodes. This is due to the fact that some countries have experienced 
several types of fiscal distress events simultaneously. 
Figure 1 shows the share of fiscal distress episodes that coincided with currency and banking 
crises using Reinhart and Rogoff’s dataset.8 We find that currency crises overlap with 26 percent 
of fiscal distress episodes, while banking crises overlap with 24 percent of fiscal distress episodes 
for the sample spanning through 2010 (the last year of Reinhart and Rogoff’s dataset). The high 
share of overlaps suggest that some of the fiscal distress events may have originated outside of 
the fiscal sector, which is consistent with the “twin crises” narrative proposed by Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (1999). 
Leading indicators 
We identify 37 variables that were used as leading indicators for fiscal distress in the literature. 
Table 3 lists these variables as well as their sources. The indicators cover not only the fiscal 
sector, but also macro, monetary, and external sectors. Some of the indicators reflect the impact 
of contagion effects and global factors, which is consistent with predictions of the theoretical 
literature. All variables are measured in percentage points. The panel is unbalanced as some 
indicators are not available for all countries and differ in time coverage.  
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics, while Table 5 presents bivariate correlations based on the 
pooled series. As shown in the latter table, most of the variables are not highly correlated with 
the exception of some debt-related indicators. This should limit the issue of multicollinearity.  
IV. Estimation Results 
In this section, we present estimation results for the baseline specification covering the whole 
sample and based on the pooled logit specification. We also check whether results are sensitive 
to changes in the sample and estimation methods. Leading indicators are assessed to be robust 
if the probability of not switching the sign exceeds 90 percent, as approximated by the normal 
distribution. We use a forecasting horizon of 1 year throughout the estimation.9 
A. Baseline Extreme Bound Analysis Model 
Table 6 presents baseline EBA estimation results. Estimations are performed using the pooled 
logit model. We use various combinations of 2 additional controls per regression, which leads 
to 630 regressions per leading indicator (23,410 regressions in total). The main reason for using 
two additional controls as a baseline is computational efficiency and a higher number of 
                                                          
8 The dataset is available at: http://www.reinhartandrogoff.com/data/. 
9 The results do not change qualitatively when using a forecasting horizon of two years. 
observations per regression. The variables are ranked according to their robustness, with most 
robust indicators placed on top.  
The estimation results suggest that both fiscal and non-fiscal variables are robust leading 
indicators of fiscal distress. We find that fiscal distress tends to follow a period of overheating in 
the real sector (widening of output gap). This is consistent with Alberola et al. (2013) finding that 
growth, if it is not driven by sound economic fundamentals, can be detrimental to systemic 
stability. A related explanation could be that a large positive output gap, even if it is non-
inflationary, can be associated with a buildup of financial imbalances, which in turn can indirectly 
lead to fiscal distress (see Borio et al. 2013).  
In addition, adverse developments in the external sector (high current account deficit, low level 
of FX reserves/GDP ratio, slowdown in FX reserves growth, and higher openness) tend to precede 
fiscal distress episodes. These results are consistent with Chakrabarti and Zeaiter (2014)’s analysis 
for external debt arrears and also Gourinchas and Obstfeld’s (2011) analysis of the causes of 
sovereign default. A negative effect of openness is also found in Manasse et al. (2003).  
Among fiscal leading indicators, we found that foreign exchange debt to GDP ratio, primary fiscal 
balance gap, as well as primary and overall fiscal balance to GDP ratios, are robust indicators, 
which is in line with most fiscal EWS such as Baldacci et al. (2011).  
One potential reason for the robustness of non-fiscal indicators could be a high correlation with 
fiscal indicators. Table 5 shows that this is not the case: for example, the correlation between FX 
reserves (% of GDP) and various robust fiscal indicators, such as primary balance, overall balance 
or primary balance gap does not exceed 0.35 in absolute terms. The same is true for the output 
gap. This indicates that non-fiscal indicators do not only pick up the effects of fiscal indicators 
but matter on their own.  
An illustration for why external factors perform better than fiscal factors as leading indicators can 
be observed in Figure 2. It shows an application of the Event Study Methodology proposed by 
Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012) where a fixed effects model is employed to regress the leading 
indicator of interest on dummies indicating the distance from a fiscal distress event. The graphs 
plot the estimated coefficients of these dummies, which are a measure of the percent deviation 
of the respective leading indicator from its “tranquil” time average. This “tranquil” time average is 
defined as the average level of the respective variable outside the Event Study horizon. Figure 2 
shows that debt to GDP ratio before the crisis is not significantly different from the levels 
observed in tranquil times, but increases rapidly after the crisis incident. This indicates that debt 
to GDP ratio – one of the key fiscal indicators used in previous studies (see, e.g., Kraay and 
Nehru, 2006) – is more of an “ex post” indicator of fiscal distress rather than a leading indicator. 
The current account balance, on the other hand, is significantly lower relative to tranquil times 
before the crisis, suggesting that it can be used as a leading indicator. This result supports the 
hypothesis that fiscal vulnerabilities can be built up outside the public sector. 
Overall, the baseline results suggest that limiting leading indicators to fiscal variables, like in 
Baldacci et al. (2011), may result in a loss of important information regarding vulnerability to 
fiscal distress.10 Consistent with predictions of most recent theories of crises, information from 
other sectors should also be monitored. 
B. Robustness Checks 
We run several additional EBA regressions to check the results for sensitivity to changes in the 
sample and estimation methods. 
“Narrow” definition of fiscal distress 
The robustness of non-fiscal leading indicators, especially those pertaining to the external sector, 
may be driven by the fact that some of the large scale IMF programs (third definition of fiscal 
distress) are triggered by balance of payment or other crises not purely linked to fiscal distress. 
Also, high inflationary pressures (fourth definition of fiscal distress) may be caused by large 
devaluations following currency crises. To check whether robustness of non-fiscal variables still 
holds for “narrow” fiscal distress episodes, we re-estimate the model using a more restrictive 
sample of fiscal distress episodes that did not overlap with banking and currency crises.  
Table 7 presents estimation results from a specification that restricts the dependent variable to 
“narrow” fiscal distress episodes. The set of robust determinants still includes non-fiscal leading 
indicators, confirming the baseline results. Gross financing needs and interest costs also turn 
robust in this specification, suggesting that borrowing cost pressures are important leading 
indicators for “narrow” fiscal distress episodes. The main drawback of this specification is that the 
sample has to be restricted through 2010, which is the last year for which banking and currency 
crisis variables are available in Reinhart and Rogoff’s database.   
Emerging economies 
As indicated in the previous section, most fiscal crisis events took place in emerging economies, 
which could explain the relatively high proportion of external leading indicators that are mostly 
relevant for emerging economies. For example, difficulties to finance a persistent current account 
deficit and the associated decline in FX reserves have historically been associated with fiscal 
distress in emerging markets. Advanced economies on the other hand, face fewer financing 
problems of this sort as they are often able to borrow in their own currency and generally rely 
less on external financing (IMF, 2010). To assess whether our baseline results are mostly driven by 
emerging economies, we redo the analysis by restricting the sample to emerging economies.11 
                                                          
10 Our results remain qualitatively unchanged when the sample is restricted to the period 1970–2010 as in 
Baldacci et al. (2011). 
11 Unfortunately, we could not replicate the analysis for advanced economies only due to the limited number of 
fiscal distress events. 
Table 8 presents estimation results from the sample of emerging economies. The set of robust 
indicators is very similar to the one for the total sample, confirming the influence of emerging 
economies in driving the main results. Out of 10 robust leading indicators found in the total 
sample, 8 remain significant in emerging economies. One additional variable that becomes 
significant for emerging economies is the unemployment rate. The latter is consistent with the 
robust result on the output gap, given that unemployment is its mirror image. 
Number of control variables 
We also check the robustness of results to the larger number of control variables. Table 9 
presents estimation results from a specification that increases the number of control variables 
from two to three. This results in substantially higher time for estimating the model, as the 
number of regressions per leading indicator increases to 7140 (264,180 regressions in total). 
Nevertheless, the main results remain unchanged, with 8 out of 10 robust indicators from 
baseline regression remaining robust. As before, the set of robust leading indicators includes 
both fiscal and non-fiscal variables.  
Random effects logit and pooled probit models 
We also check robustness of main results to types of discrete choice models.  
First, we control for unobserved country-specific heterogeneity by using a random effects logit 
model.12 Table 10 presents estimation results, showing that the set of robust indicators remains 
qualitatively unchanged, with 8 out of 10 robust indicators from baseline regression remaining 
robust.  
Second, given that logit model has fatter tails than probit model, we also check sensitivity to tail 
risks by using a pooled probit model. Table 11 presents estimation results, showing that the set 
of robust indicators remains practically unchanged and suggesting that fat tails are not affecting 
the results.  
Using alternative filtering technique for output gap 
Throughout the analysis, we find a persistent evidence of robustness of the output gap variable, 
which comes on top of the list in all tables. This could be due to the fact that that the two-sided 
HP filter used to estimate the output gap could potentially bias the results prior to fiscal crises as 
one uses future values of output, already affected by the crisis, to smooth past series. To check 
the sensitivity of results to the smoothing technique, we use one-sided filter of Christiano and 
Fitzgerald (2003). Table 11 presents estimation results using this filter. The results remain 
                                                          
12 We have also tried a fixed effects logit specification and the results remain similar. The main drawback of the 
fixed effect model is that it drops countries that never experienced a fiscal distress (see Bussière, 2013 for a 
discussion). 
unchanged suggesting that measurement of the output gap does not constitute a problem and 
reinforcing the importance of output cycles as leading indicators of fiscal crises.   
V. Fiscal Distress Index and Its Performance 
In this section, we present an alternative fiscal distress index based on the most robust leading 
indicators identified using the EBA methodology (Table 13).13 We then measure its performance 
for in-sample and out-of-sample and make a comparison with other EWS in the literature. 
A natural question which arises is which indicators have the largest contribution to the fiscal 
distress index. In order to assess this, Figure 8 shows the impact of changes in robust leading 
indicators between the 75th and the 25th percentile on the logarithm of the odds ratio of the 
fiscal crisis. It is computed as ?̂?𝑖𝑥𝑖
(0.75) − ?̂?𝑖𝑥𝑖(0.25) , where 𝑥𝑖𝑞 is the qth quantile of leading indicator 
i. The figure shows that non-fiscal indicators have a larger relative impact on the fiscal distress 
index than fiscal indicators reflecting their importance in assessing underlying vulnerabilities. 
A. Fiscal Distress Index 
Figure 3 presents the evolution of the fiscal distress index based on most robust leading 
indicators for advanced and emerging economies and the fiscal distress incidents. This index is 
obtained by computing the predicted values from the logit model, which includes the most 
robust leading indicators obtained in the first step. Two observations are worth noting. First, the 
level of fiscal stress tends to be lower in advanced economies compared to emerging economies, 
which is consistent with the fact that advanced economies have a lower propensity to distress on 
average. Second, there are spikes in the level of fiscal distress around periods of notable financial 
crises (late 1990s, the global financial crisis). This is consistent with the empirical regularity of 
clustering across different types of crises due to contagion effects. 
B. Measure of Performance 
As pointed out by Ho (2015), it is not obvious that the most robust leading indicators are also 
those that yield the best predictive performance of an EWS. This is why, following Baldacci et al. 
(2011), we assess the performance of our model using the total misclassification error: 
𝑻𝑴𝑻(𝒕) = 𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝟏(𝒕) + 𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻(𝒕)                                                                                              (4)  
where Type1 indicates missed crises as a share of all crises, Type2 indicates false alarms as a share 
of all non-crisis periods, and t is the threshold level. The choice of the threshold level is made by 
the policymaker who faces a trade-off. If t is set too high, the index will cross it in very few cases 
and many crises will be missed resulting in a large Type 1 error. Alternatively, if t is set too low, 
                                                          
13 The index does not include primary balance gap variable (because of low numbers of observations), the foreign 
exchange debt ratio (because the series end in 2012), and the FX reserves to GDP ratio (because we already 
control for the FX reserves growth variable). 
the index will cross the threshold very often so that many alarms will be falsely issued resulting in 
a large Type 2 error. We assume that the utility of the policy maker can be represented by using 
TME as a loss function, which is minimized over t. 
Figure 4 presents in-sample performance for different threshold values for both the EBA-based 
indicator and the Baldacci et al (2011) fiscal distress index. Neither model is dominated by the 
other as the performance depends on the choice of the threshold. Figure 4 shows that the TME 
of the EBA-based indicator is minimized at 0.52 when the level of threshold is 0.7. The Baldacci et 
al. (2011) fiscal distress index obtains a minimum of 0.73 when the level of the threshold is 0.38. 
The TME is thus reduced by 29 percent for the optimal choice of the threshold, suggesting that 
our model has a better fit. 
Figure 5 presents in-sample and out-of-sample performance for different threshold values of the 
EBA-based fiscal distress indicator. We use the years 1970 through 2007 to fit the model, 
compute the coefficients and obtain the threshold. The model is then applied to the 
years 2008 through 2015 computing the fiscal distress index by combining these estimated 
coefficients from the model-fitting sample with the data in the prediction sample. As expected, 
the in-sample performance outperforms out-of-sample performance. Nevertheless, the minimum 
TME for the out-of-sample is not much higher than in-sample TME suggesting that our model 
would have done well predicting the post–2007 sample using information up to 2007. 
Figure 6 presents classification table for out-of-sample predictions made by the EBA-based fiscal 
distress indicator. It is an illustration for the two types of errors that every EWS makes and which 
were explained above. Out of the 32 crises which were identified between 2008 and 2015, the 
model predicts 25 correctly (78 percent). A false alarm is issued for 118 out of 344 non-crisis 
years (34 percent).  
Figure 7 presents comparison with other studies. It plots the minimum, 25th percentile, mean, 75th  
percentile and maximum of the 3 relevant quality measures of an EWS: The TME, type 1 error and 
type 2 error  It shows that our model is within the 1st and 3rd quartile of the TME when compared 
to other studies on EWS. It performs slightly worse than average regarding the type 2 errors and 
slightly better regarding the type 1 errors. As mentioned in Berg and Pattillo (2005), a different 
trade-off between the two error types could be achieved using an asymmetrically weighed loss 
function. Our model is conservative, issuing false alarms relatively more often than an average 
EWS study, which seems reasonable from a policymaker’s perspective as a missed crisis is likely 
to be more costly than a false alarm.  
VI. Conclusions 
Reviewing the large literature on EWS for fiscal distress, we have assessed the robustness of the 
leading indicators employed in these studies using the Extreme Bound Analysis. We find both 
fiscal and non-fiscal leading indicators to be robust, consistent with the prediction of recent 
theoretical studies emphasizing the role of multiple equilibria and spillovers across different 
sectors of the economy. 
In a second step, we build a vulnerability index using the most robust leading indicators and find 
that its predictive properties are close to the average found in other EWS (for fiscal, currency, 
banking, and other types of crises) in the literature. However, the use of robust fiscal and non-
fiscal leading indicators helps us to improve performance relative to Baldacci et al. (2011) EWS 
based on fiscal indicators only. From a policy perspective, these results suggest that some non-
fiscal leading indicators should be monitored as closely as fiscal leading indicators to assess a 
country’s vulnerability to fiscal distress. 
Designing a EWS based on robust leading indicators poses several problems, which could be 
addressed in the future. First, the estimation sample using a logit model is constrained by the 
shortest time series, which can significantly reduce the sample size and thus precision. Second, 
while using a pooled sample of both advanced and emerging economies does increase the 
sample size, it constrains the leading indicators and their relative effects to be the same across 
the two subsamples. However, separate analysis for advanced economies only is complicated 
given that most fiscal crises have occurred in emerging economies. Lastly, identifying “narrow” 
fiscal distress events is challenging due to the frequent occurrence of twin or multiple crises and 
the spillovers among them.   
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Table 1. Definition of Fiscal Distress 
 
 
Source: Baldacci et al. (2011). 
 
 
 
Table 2. Fiscal Distress Episodes 
 
 
Source: Baldacci et al. (2011) and authors' calculations for 2011–2015. 
Note: The numbers in brackets represent fiscal distress episodes in the original Baldacci et al. (2011) dataset 
running through 2010. 
 
 
Event Criteria Advanced Economies Emerging Economies
Public debt default or restructuring Failure to service debt 
as payments come due, 
as well as distressed 
debt exchanges
S&P definition S&P definition
Extreme financing constraint of the 
sovereign
Sovereign yield 
pressure
Sovereign spreads 
greater than 1,000 
basis points or 2 s.d. 
from the country 
average
Sovereign spreads 
greater than 1,000 
basis points or 2 s.d. 
from the country 
average
Large financing Large IMF-supported 
program
Access to 100 percent 
of quota or more
Access to 100 percent 
of quota or more
Implicit/Internal public debt default High inflation rate Inflation greater than 
35 percent per annum
Inflation greater than 
500 percent per annum
Sovereign Default or 
Restructuring
Bond Yield 
Pressures
Inflation 
Pressures
IMF 
program
Total
Advanced Economies 1 (0) 30 (29) 5 (5) 8 (6) 41 (39)
Emerging Economies 54 (52) 17 (15) 6 (6) 103 (79) 160 (135)
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Table 3. List of Leading Indicators of Fiscal Distress 
 
 
Source: Survey of the literature by the authors. 
 
 
Leading Indicator Source Grouping Method Description
Average Maturity Baldacci et al. (2011) Public Sector: Liquidity Pressure Indicators Signals Average Maturity of remaining debt (in years)
Gross Financing Need Baldacci et al. (2011) Public Sector: Debt Burden Signals Gross financing needs (short-term debt plus the overall balance), percent of GDP
Interest-Growth Differential Baldacci et al. (2011) Public Sector: Debt Tolerance Indicators Signals Difference between average effective interest rate and GDP growth in percent
Primary Balance (% of GDP) Baldacci et al. (2011) Public Sector: Liquidity Pressure Indicators Signals Revenue-Expenditure+Interest Expenditure, percent of GDP
Short Term Debt (% of FX Reserves) Baldacci et al. (2011) Public Sector: Debt Burden Signals Short Term Debt, percent of FX Reserves
Short Term Debt (% of total) Baldacci et al. (2011) Public Sector: Debt Burden Signals Short Term Debt, percent of total Debt
GDP per Capita Chakrabarti and Zeaiter (2014) Public Sector: Debt Tolerance Indicators EBA and OLS Gross domestic product per capita, current prices in U.S. dollars
Concessional Debt (% of total) Detragiache and Spilimbergo (2001) Public Sector: Debt Burden OLS, Probit, Logit (FE) Concessional Debt, percent of total Debt
Debt owed to Commercial Banks (% of total) Detragiache and Spilimbergo (2001) Public Sector: Debt Burden OLS, Probit, Logit (FE) Debt owed to Commercial Banks, percent of total Debt
Debt owed to Multilateral Creditors (% of total) Detragiache and Spilimbergo (2001) Public Sector: Debt Burden OLS, Probit, Logit (FE) Debt owed to Multilateral Creditors, percent of total Debt
Debt Service due (% of GDP) Detragiache and Spilimbergo (2001) Public Sector: Liquidity Pressure Indicators OLS, Probit, Logit (FE) Debt Service due, percent of GDP
Current Account Balance (% of GDP) Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012) Public Sector: Liquidity Pressure Indicators Logit Balance on current account, percent of GDP
Domestic Credit Gap Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012) Public Sector: Macroeconomic Factors Logit Domestic Credit percent deviation from HP-filter trend
FX Reserves (% of GDP) Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012) Public Sector: Macroeconomic Factors Logit Foreign Exchange Reserves, percent of GDP
Real Exchange Rate Undervaluation Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012) Public Sector: Macroeconomic Factors Logit Percent deviation of real effective exchange rate from HP filter trend
Real Interest Rate Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012) Public Sector: Macroeconomic Factors Logit 6 months Treasury Bill Rate - CPI Inflation (end of period percentage change)
Short Term External Debt (% of GDP) Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012) Public Sector: Debt Burden Logit Short Term External Debt, percent of GDP
Change in Net Claims on Central Government Hemming et al. (2003) Public Sector: Liquidity Pressure Indicators Probit, Signals Change in Net Claims on Central Government, in percent
CPI Inflation Manasse et al. (2003) Public Sector: Macroeconomic Factors Logit, Binary Tree Consumer Prices, end-of-period, percent change
Debt (% of GDP) Manasse et al. (2003) Public Sector: Debt Burden Logit, Binary Tree Public Debt, percent of GDP 
External Debt (% of GDP) Manasse et al. (2003) Public Sector: Debt Burden Logit, Binary Tree Total external debt, gross, including arrears and other short-term debt, percent of GDP
FDI (% of GDP) Manasse et al. (2003) Public Sector: Macroeconomic Factors Logit, Binary Tree Foreign direct investment, net inflows in reporting economy, percent of GDP
FX Reserves Growth Manasse et al. (2003) Public Sector: Debt Tolerance Indicators Logit, Binary Tree Annual percentage change in Foreign Exchange Reserves
Interest Expenditure (% of total Expenditure) Manasse et al. (2003) Public Sector: Liquidity Pressure Indicators Logit, Binary Tree Interest Expenditure, percent of total Expenditure
LIBOR Manasse et al. (2003) Contagion Effects and Global Factors Logit, Binary Tree London Interbank Offered Rate
Nominal GDP Growth Manasse et al. (2003) Public Sector: Macroeconomic Factors Logit, Binary Tree Nominal GDP, annual percentage change
Openness: (M+X)/ GDP Manasse et al. (2003) Public Sector: Macroeconomic Factors Logit, Binary Tree Exports+Imports, percent of GDP
Overall Fiscal Balance (% of GDP) Manasse et al. (2003) Public Sector: Liquidity Pressure Indicators Logit, Binary Tree Revenue-Expenditure, percent of GDP
Real GDP Growth Manasse et al. (2003) Public Sector: Macroeconomic Factors Logit, Binary Tree Gross domestic product, constant prices,  annual percentage change
Unemployment Rate Manasse et al. (2003) Public Sector: Macroeconomic Factors Logit, Binary Tree Unemployment Rate
US TBill Rate Manasse et al. (2003) Contagion Effects and Global Factors Logit, Binary Tree 6 months US Treasury Bill Rate
Output Gap Ostry et al. (2010) Public Sector: Macroeconomic Factors OLS Percent deviation of real GDP from Baxter-King filter 
Average Effective Interest Rate VEE 2014 Public Sector: Liquidity Pressure Indicators Signals Interest payments(t)/General Government Debt(t-1)
Foreign Exchange Debt (% of GDP) VEE 2014 Public Sector: Debt Burden Signals General government gross debt in foreign currency, percent of GDP
FX Reserve Coverage VEE 2014 External Sector Signals Reserves, percent of (Short Term debt at remaning maturity+Current Account deficit)
Primary Balance Gap (% of GDP) VEE 2014 Public Sector: Liquidity Pressure Indicators Signals Primary Balance Gap, percent of GDP
Amortisation of Total Public Debt (% of GDP ) VEE 2015 External Sector Signals Amortization paid, (principal only), percent of GDP
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Source: IMF WEO, World Development Indicators, International Finance Statistics, Government Finance Statistics. 
 
 
 
 
Obs. Mean Median St. Dev. 10th percentile 90th percentile
Debt (% of GDP) 3,073 52.5 45.3 34.1 16.6 95.2
Output Gap 3,188 -0.1 -0.1 2.0 -1.5 1.3
Openness: (M+X)/ GDP 3,254 71.2 60.0 53.2 26.1 123.0
CPI Inflation 2,804 28.3 6.2 224.0 1.4 26.1
FX Reserve Coverage 1,581 1.7 0.7 11.2 0.1 2.9
Amortisation of Total Public Debt (% of GDP ) 2,030 10.0 4.2 19.9 0.6 19.4
Real Interest Rate 1,387 -1.2 1.4 52.9 -4.9 6.9
Domestic Credit Gap 2,588 -48.1 -1.4 1754.8 -94.0 26.3
Current Account Balance (% of GDP) 3,275 -2.1 -1.9 7.6 -8.4 4.7
Real Exchange Rate Undervaluation 2,877 -3.6 -1.5 38.0 -24.6 20.3
FX Reserves (% of GDP) 3,103 12.3 7.5 15.0 1.9 25.9
Short Term External Debt (% of GDP) 2,142 14.4 4.8 37.8 0.0 27.6
Interest-Growth Differential 2,154 -15.7 -4.1 108.6 -24.7 3.0
Primary Balance (% of GDP) 1,874 0.7 0.3 3.9 -3.4 5.3
Short Term Debt (% of total) 2,107 17.9 13.8 17.5 0.0 41.3
Short Term Debt (% of FX Reserves) 1,984 654.0 51.6 5328.2 0.0 438.5
Debt owed to Commercial Banks (% of total) 1,423 11.3 5.8 14.0 0.1 30.6
Concessional Debt (% of total) 1,632 22.8 15.6 22.1 1.3 58.9
Debt owed to Multilateral Creditors (% of total) 1,632 17.4 14.1 13.1 3.7 35.3
Debt Service due (% of GDP) 1,602 5.8 4.3 6.4 1.4 10.9
FX Reserves Growth 3,051 18.3 9.4 52.4 -19.8 58.6
LIBOR 3,670 2.5 2.6 2.5 -1.1 5.4
US TBill Rate 3,592 5.1 5.0 3.3 0.1 9.6
Unemployment Rate 2,546 8.5 7.2 6.0 2.6 15.7
Nominal GDP Growth 3,046 40.4 11.2 297.2 2.8 34.9
Real GDP Growth 3,269 3.5 3.7 4.9 -0.9 8.3
External Debt (% of GDP) 2,475 68.2 44.4 90.0 14.5 141.1
FDI (% of GDP) 2,972 -1.4 -0.7 3.4 -5.1 1.0
Overall Fiscal Balance (% of GDP) 2,035 -2.5 -2.5 4.3 -7.4 2.1
Interest Expenditure (% of total Expenditure) 1,908 9.9 7.8 8.9 2.3 20.2
Change in Net Claims on Central Government 2,415 47.4 10.8 795.9 -48.3 116.4
GDP per Capita 3,291 9.3 9.7 4.2 6.0 13.3
Average Effective Interest Rate 1,951 17.5 0.2 75.1 0.0 14.4
Gross Financing Need 735 11.4 8.8 11.3 1.3 26.6
Average Maturity 733 7.2 6.2 4.2 3.0 13.3
Primary Balance Gap (% of GDP) 688 0.9 0.8 8.3 -4.7 7.6
Foreign Exchange Debt (% of GDP) 1,124 15.4 4.4 22.6 0.0 41.5
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Table 5. Correlation Matrix 
 
 
Debt (% 
of GDP)
Output 
Gap
Openness
: (M+X)/ 
GDP
CPI 
Inflatio
n
FX 
Reserve 
Coverag
e
Amortisation 
of Total 
Public Debt 
(% of GDP )
Real 
Interes
t Rate
Domesti
c Credit 
Gap
Current 
Account 
Balance 
(% of 
GDP)
Real 
Exchange 
Rate 
Undervaluati
on
FX 
Reserves 
(% of 
GDP)
Short Term 
External 
Debt (% of 
GDP)
Interest-
Growth 
Differentia
l
Primary 
Balance 
(% of 
GDP)
Short 
Term 
Debt (% 
of 
total)
Short 
Term 
Debt (% 
of FX 
Reserves
)
Debt owed 
to 
Commercia
l Banks (% 
of total)
Concession
al Debt (% 
of total)
Debt owed 
to 
Multilateral 
Creditors 
(% of total)
Debt (% of GDP) 1.000
Output Gap -0.173 1.000
Openness: (M+X)/ GDP -0.160 -0.007 1.000
CPI Inflation 0.249 -0.070 -0.034 1.000
FX Reserve Coverage -0.272 -0.057 0.291 -0.199 1.000
Amortisation of Total Public Debt (% of GDP -0.421 0.063 0.106 0.017 -0.260 1.000
Real Interest Rate 0.353 -0.054 -0.650 0.064 -0.326 -0.108 1.000
Domestic Credit Gap 0.059 0.299 -0.143 0.002 -0.551 0.108 0.063 1.000
Current Account Balance (% of GDP) -0.451 -0.087 -0.238 -0.323 0.378 0.403 0.160 -0.156 1.000
Real Exchange Rate Undervaluation 0.202 0.012 0.290 0.096 -0.017 0.195 -0.247 0.062 -0.083 1.000
FX Reserves (% of GDP) -0.223 0.114 0.715 -0.151 0.282 0.397 -0.562 -0.156 0.096 0.150 1.000
Short Term External Debt (% of GDP) -0.595 0.110 0.026 -0.162 -0.224 0.906 -0.138 0.223 0.462 0.064 0.302 1.000
Interest-Growth Differential 0.556 0.108 -0.414 -0.384 -0.238 -0.149 0.346 0.062 -0.044 0.026 -0.168 -0.154 1.000
Primary Balance (% of GDP) 0.652 0.042 -0.374 0.106 -0.232 -0.281 0.491 -0.152 -0.218 -0.177 -0.269 -0.385 0.673 1.000
Short Term Debt (% of total) -0.665 0.295 0.039 -0.184 -0.184 0.703 -0.173 0.252 0.364 -0.117 0.299 0.868 -0.131 -0.285 1.000
Short Term Debt (% of FX Reserves) -0.546 0.085 -0.323 -0.003 -0.361 0.642 0.087 0.245 0.297 -0.047 -0.226 0.804 -0.160 -0.249 0.733 1.000
Debt owed to Commercial Banks (% of tota -0.059 -0.011 -0.092 0.563 -0.417 0.357 0.343 0.011 -0.114 -0.295 -0.095 0.295 -0.297 0.206 0.359 0.427 1.000
Concessional Debt (% of total) -0.215 -0.222 0.604 -0.028 0.498 -0.325 -0.489 -0.173 -0.102 0.158 0.215 -0.332 -0.615 -0.593 -0.399 -0.429 -0.417 1.000
Debt owed to Multilateral Creditors (% of to 0.265 -0.276 0.307 0.012 0.306 -0.672 -0.139 -0.067 -0.300 0.098 -0.068 -0.712 -0.241 -0.156 -0.741 -0.689 -0.470 0.818 1.000
Debt (% 
of GDP)
Output 
Gap
Openness
: (M+X)/ 
GDP
CPI 
Inflatio
n
FX 
Reserve 
Coverag
e
Amortisation 
of Total 
Public Debt 
(% of GDP )
Real 
Interes
t Rate
Domesti
c Credit 
Gap
Current 
Account 
Balance 
(% of 
GDP)
Real 
Exchange 
Rate 
Undervaluati
on
FX 
Reserves 
(% of 
GDP)
Short Term 
External 
Debt (% of 
GDP)
Interest-
Growth 
Differentia
l
Primary 
Balance 
(% of 
GDP)
Short 
Term 
Debt (% 
of 
total)
Short 
Term 
Debt (% 
of FX 
Reserves
)
Debt owed 
to 
Commercia
l Banks (% 
of total)
Concession
al Debt (% 
of total)
Debt owed 
to 
Multilateral 
Creditors 
(% of total)
Debt Service due (% of GDP) 0.444 -0.200 -0.226 0.093 -0.329 0.485 0.326 -0.047 0.148 0.267 0.043 0.271 0.444 0.370 -0.066 0.108 0.153 -0.493 -0.378
FX Reserves Growth -0.075 -0.027 -0.163 0.004 0.347 -0.205 0.013 -0.325 0.252 -0.361 0.159 -0.124 0.078 0.146 -0.007 -0.128 0.009 -0.077 -0.040
LIBOR -0.194 0.190 0.024 -0.261 0.193 -0.186 -0.033 -0.132 -0.011 -0.321 0.087 -0.060 0.149 0.003 0.041 -0.147 -0.162 0.044 0.056
US TBill Rate -0.190 0.022 -0.090 -0.339 0.271 -0.151 0.026 -0.347 0.123 -0.358 0.055 -0.045 0.221 0.151 0.014 -0.098 -0.135 -0.060 -0.039
Unemployment Rate 0.219 0.035 -0.456 -0.003 -0.371 -0.177 0.311 0.083 -0.216 0.092 -0.578 -0.057 0.494 0.392 0.015 0.350 0.037 -0.418 -0.170
Nominal GDP Growth -0.020 -0.132 -0.047 0.872 -0.075 0.037 0.129 -0.094 -0.129 -0.030 -0.185 -0.094 -0.617 -0.056 -0.121 0.121 0.590 0.101 0.033
Real GDP Growth -0.680 0.010 -0.070 -0.031 0.267 0.233 -0.055 -0.118 0.437 -0.262 -0.047 0.327 -0.645 -0.476 0.281 0.441 0.195 0.229 -0.121
External Debt (% of GDP) 0.355 -0.256 -0.007 0.084 -0.216 0.358 0.053 0.045 -0.017 0.493 0.005 0.202 0.194 0.012 -0.259 0.121 -0.117 -0.052 -0.028
FDI (% of GDP) -0.265 -0.105 -0.629 -0.164 0.069 0.329 0.324 -0.047 0.710 -0.158 -0.273 0.455 0.167 -0.035 0.358 0.553 0.066 -0.442 -0.511
Overall Fiscal Balance (% of GDP) -0.596 0.283 0.281 -0.664 0.306 0.168 -0.440 -0.156 0.268 -0.168 0.349 0.326 0.053 -0.115 0.491 0.163 -0.268 0.054 -0.210
Interest Expenditure (% of total Expenditur 0.878 -0.183 -0.390 0.316 -0.337 -0.294 0.547 0.006 -0.293 0.064 -0.354 -0.461 0.571 0.790 -0.568 -0.325 0.113 -0.385 0.115
Change in Net Claims on Central Governme 0.159 0.047 0.178 0.133 0.102 -0.059 -0.018 0.078 -0.030 0.083 0.148 -0.145 -0.162 -0.139 -0.256 -0.299 -0.173 0.300 0.316
GDP per Capita -0.088 -0.096 0.849 -0.037 0.416 -0.314 -0.601 -0.129 -0.320 0.250 0.382 -0.339 -0.462 -0.423 -0.292 -0.478 -0.335 0.841 0.655
Average Effective Interest Rate -0.307 -0.141 0.642 0.098 0.333 -0.237 -0.461 -0.080 -0.194 0.081 0.194 -0.236 -0.715 -0.592 -0.204 -0.231 -0.144 0.825 0.567
Gross Financing Need 0.585 -0.341 -0.617 0.421 -0.313 -0.014 0.693 -0.053 0.095 0.061 -0.450 -0.190 0.276 0.442 -0.417 -0.019 0.245 -0.384 -0.041
Average Maturity 0.254 0.089 -0.061 -0.260 0.218 -0.332 -0.185 -0.026 -0.172 0.321 -0.084 -0.324 0.289 -0.045 -0.439 -0.331 -0.682 0.131 0.200
Primary Balance Gap (% of GDP) -0.138 -0.093 -0.108 0.262 0.242 -0.021 -0.182 -0.258 0.194 -0.251 0.028 -0.048 -0.198 0.200 0.011 0.057 0.164 -0.080 -0.155
Foreign Exchange Debt (% of GDP) 0.842 -0.207 0.162 0.311 -0.148 -0.351 0.086 -0.008 -0.575 0.343 -0.075 -0.552 0.286 0.439 -0.717 -0.530 -0.098 0.109 0.447
 Table 5. Correlation Matrix (continued) 
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Interest 
Rate
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Average 
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Debt Service due (% of GDP) 1.000
FX Reserves Growth -0.149 1.000
LIBOR -0.248 0.342 1.000
US TBill Rate -0.092 0.462 0.876 1.000
Unemployment Rate 0.035 -0.006 0.085 0.081 1.000
Nominal GDP Growth -0.061 0.054 -0.304 -0.317 -0.102 1.000
Real GDP Growth -0.268 0.126 -0.172 -0.023 -0.316 0.377 1.000
External Debt (% of GDP) 0.742 -0.284 -0.226 -0.162 0.117 -0.023 -0.182 1.000
FDI (% of GDP) 0.249 0.169 -0.104 0.060 0.225 -0.050 0.344 0.102 1.000
Overall Fiscal Balance (% of GDP) -0.327 0.148 0.348 0.414 -0.073 -0.538 0.211 -0.384 0.031 1.000
Interest Expenditure (% of total Expenditure 0.561 -0.019 -0.142 -0.068 0.379 0.094 -0.559 0.421 -0.049 -0.609 1.000
Change in Net Claims on Central Governme 0.037 -0.073 -0.152 -0.291 -0.404 0.068 -0.063 0.110 -0.354 -0.235 0.046 1.000
GDP per Capita -0.508 -0.143 0.012 -0.126 -0.341 0.006 -0.013 -0.109 -0.673 0.162 -0.358 0.237 1.000
Average Effective Interest Rate -0.606 -0.097 -0.088 -0.233 -0.392 0.276 0.321 -0.221 -0.513 0.074 -0.523 0.247 0.866 1.000
Gross Financing Need 0.629 0.041 -0.252 -0.138 0.219 0.340 -0.170 0.460 0.319 -0.757 0.761 0.116 -0.579 -0.478 1.000
Average Maturity 0.038 -0.082 0.101 0.106 -0.024 -0.284 -0.180 0.276 -0.105 -0.025 0.055 0.070 0.141 0.018 -0.048 1.000
Primary Balance Gap (% of GDP) -0.051 0.333 -0.317 -0.107 -0.169 0.390 0.363 -0.172 0.141 0.105 0.006 -0.024 -0.065 0.066 0.046 -0.158 1.000
Foreign Exchange Debt (% of GDP) 0.382 -0.213 -0.168 -0.173 0.164 0.077 -0.566 0.561 -0.457 -0.560 0.771 0.185 0.232 -0.048 0.410 0.243 -0.132 1.000
Table 6. EBA Results: Baseline Specification 
 
 
Note: Reported are estimation results from the EBA regression. The dependent variable is Baldacci et al. (2011) 
definition of fiscal distress: (i) debt default or restructuring; (ii) sovereign bond yield pressure; (iii) large IMF-
supported program; and (iv) excessive inflation. Estimations are performed using the pooled logit model, with 2 
additional controls per specification. The variables are ranked according to their robustness, with most robust 
indicators placed on top. The sample covers 29 advanced and 52 emerging economies for the period 1970–2015.  
Coeff. SE C(0) Obs.
Output Gap 0.296 0.069 1.000 3188
Current Account Balance (% of GDP) -0.046 0.014 1.000 3275
FX Reserves Growth -0.010 0.003 0.998 3051
FX Reserves (% of GDP) -0.034 0.012 0.998 3103
Openness: (M+X)/ GDP -0.006 0.003 0.970 3254
Primary Balance Gap (% of GDP) -0.029 0.017 0.958 688
Real GDP Growth -0.039 0.023 0.957 3269
Overall Fiscal Balance (% of GDP) -0.052 0.031 0.953 2035
Primary Balance (% of GDP) -0.048 0.037 0.907 1874
Foreign Exchange Debt (% of GDP) 0.008 0.006 0.903 1124
Gross Financing Need 0.016 0.013 0.885 735
Change in Net Claims on Central Government 0.000 0.000 0.861 2415
Short Term Debt (% of total) -0.008 0.007 0.854 2107
Unemployment Rate -0.020 0.021 0.826 2546
LIBOR 0.042 0.049 0.801 3670
FX Reserve Coverage -0.012 0.015 0.788 1581
CPI Inflation 0.004 0.005 0.786 2804
Concessional Debt (% of total) -0.004 0.006 0.766 1632
Interest Expenditure (% of total Expenditure) 0.010 0.014 0.763 1908
Domestic Credit Gap 0.001 0.002 0.755 2588
Real Interest Rate 0.010 0.015 0.752 1387
Short Term External Debt (% of GDP) -0.005 0.008 0.746 2142
Debt (% of GDP) -0.002 0.004 0.744 3073
Real Exchange Rate Undervaluation -0.002 0.004 0.741 2877
External Debt (% of GDP) -0.002 0.003 0.722 2475
Average Maturity -0.020 0.039 0.698 733
FDI (% of GDP) 0.010 0.033 0.625 2972
Amortisation of Total Public Debt (% of GDP ) -0.003 0.008 0.622 2030
Debt owed to Commercial Banks (% of total) -0.005 0.016 0.618 1423
US TBill Rate 0.010 0.042 0.594 3592
GDP per Capita -0.006 0.033 0.575 3291
Short Term Debt (% of FX Reserves) 0.000 0.001 0.568 1984
Nominal GDP Growth 0.001 0.005 0.567 3046
Debt Service due (% of GDP) -0.003 0.020 0.551 1602
Debt owed to Multilateral Creditors (% of total) 0.001 0.009 0.545 1632
Interest-Growth Differential -0.001 0.008 0.527 2154
Average Effective Interest Rate 0.000 0.002 0.523 1951
Table 7. Robustness Check 1: “Narrow” Fiscal Distress Episodes 
 
 
Note: Reported are estimation results from the EBA regression. The dependent variable is the narrower fiscal stress definition, 
which excludes Currency and Banking crises as identifies in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). Estimations are performed using the 
pooled logit model, with 2 additional controls per specification. The variables are ranked according to their robustness, with 
most robust indicators placed on top. The sample covers 29 advanced and 52 emerging economies for the period 1970–2010. 
 
Table 7. Robustness check 1: “Purely” fiscal distress episodes
Coeff. SE C(0) Obs.
Output Gap 0.194 0.076 0.995 2955
FX Reserves Growth -0.011 0.006 0.979 2736
CPI Inflation 0.025 0.012 0.978 2576
FX Reserves (% of GDP) -0.049 0.024 0.977 2788
Primary Balance Gap (% of GDP) -0.105 0.057 0.968 453
Gross Financing Need 0.032 0.017 0.965 502
Real Interest Rate 0.064 0.037 0.959 1263
Openness: (M+X)/ GDP -0.010 0.006 0.951 2859
Current Account Balance (% of GDP) -0.037 0.024 0.940 2882
Change in Net Claims on Central Government 0.000 0.000 0.939 2415
Overall Fiscal Balance (% of GDP) -0.083 0.054 0.939 1640
Interest Expenditure (% of total Expenditure) 0.042 0.030 0.920 1513
FX Reserve Coverage -0.023 0.021 0.870 1385
Average Maturity -0.064 0.062 0.850 514
Nominal GDP Growth 0.012 0.012 0.832 2812
External Debt (% of GDP) -0.005 0.006 0.831 2081
Debt owed to Multilateral Creditors (% of total) -0.012 0.015 0.783 1509
Foreign Exchange Debt (% of GDP) 0.009 0.011 0.782 994
Concessional Debt (% of total) -0.006 0.010 0.730 1509
Debt Service due (% of GDP) -0.030 0.055 0.708 1479
Short Term External Debt (% of GDP) -0.011 0.020 0.702 1834
Real Exchange Rate Undervaluation -0.003 0.008 0.671 2646
Average Effective Interest Rate 0.003 0.008 0.651 1556
Interest-Growth Differential -0.006 0.017 0.649 1920
Short Term Debt (% of total) -0.005 0.013 0.645 1797
GDP per Capita 0.018 0.057 0.627 2896
Debt owed to Commercial Banks (% of total) 0.006 0.018 0.620 1423
Domestic Credit Gap 0.001 0.002 0.609 2588
US TBill Rate 0.015 0.060 0.600 3280
Debt (% of GDP) -0.001 0.006 0.558 2678
Short Term Debt (% of FX Reserves) 0.000 0.001 0.551 1736
LIBOR 0.009 0.073 0.547 3280
Unemployment Rate -0.004 0.039 0.544 2175
Amortisation of Total Public Debt (% of GDP ) 0.002 0.021 0.541 1767
Real GDP Growth -0.004 0.045 0.533 2874
Primary Balance (% of GDP) -0.004 0.061 0.528 1479
FDI (% of GDP) 0.003 0.067 0.516 2579
Table 8. Robustness Check 2: Emerging Economies 
 
 
Note: Reported are estimation results from the EBA regression. The dependent variable is Baldacci et al. (2011) 
definition of fiscal distress: (i) debt default or restructuring; (ii) sovereign bond yield pressure; (iii) large IMF-
supported program; and (iv) excessive inflation. Estimations are performed using the pooled logit model, with two 
additional controls per specification. The variables are ranked according to their robustness, with most robust 
indicators placed on top. The sample covers 52 emerging economies for the period 1970–2015. 
  
Coeff. SE C(0) Obs.
Output Gap 0.259 0.070 1.000 3188
FX Reserves Growth -0.012 0.004 0.999 3051
FX Reserves (% of GDP) -0.040 0.013 0.999 3103
Current Account Balance (% of GDP) -0.033 0.014 0.989 3275
Real GDP Growth -0.050 0.023 0.987 3269
Overall Fiscal Balance (% of GDP) -0.066 0.035 0.972 2035
Primary Balance Gap (% of GDP) -0.029 0.017 0.958 688
Unemployment Rate -0.035 0.023 0.937 2546
Primary Balance (% of GDP) -0.056 0.042 0.911 1874
Openness: (M+X)/ GDP -0.004 0.003 0.896 3254
Gross Financing Need 0.016 0.013 0.885 735
Change in Net Claims on Central Government 0.000 0.000 0.865 2415
FDI (% of GDP) 0.037 0.041 0.816 2972
FX Reserve Coverage -0.012 0.015 0.784 1581
Short Term Debt (% of total) -0.006 0.008 0.770 2107
Concessional Debt (% of total) -0.004 0.006 0.766 1632
LIBOR 0.039 0.054 0.766 3670
CPI Inflation 0.004 0.006 0.750 2804
Short Term External Debt (% of GDP) -0.007 0.010 0.749 2142
Domestic Credit Gap 0.001 0.002 0.748 2588
External Debt (% of GDP) -0.002 0.004 0.719 2475
Average Maturity -0.020 0.039 0.698 733
Real Interest Rate 0.008 0.015 0.696 1387
Real Exchange Rate Undervaluation -0.002 0.005 0.658 2877
Interest-Growth Differential 0.003 0.009 0.638 2154
Foreign Exchange Debt (% of GDP) 0.002 0.007 0.629 1124
Short Term Debt (% of FX Reserves) 0.000 0.001 0.622 1984
Debt (% of GDP) -0.001 0.004 0.621 3073
Debt owed to Commercial Banks (% of total) -0.005 0.016 0.618 1423
Average Effective Interest Rate -0.001 0.003 0.607 1951
US TBill Rate 0.006 0.047 0.552 3592
GDP per Capita 0.004 0.035 0.551 3291
Debt Service due (% of GDP) -0.003 0.020 0.551 1602
Nominal GDP Growth -0.001 0.006 0.547 3046
Debt owed to Multilateral Creditors (% of total) 0.001 0.009 0.545 1632
Amortisation of Total Public Debt (% of GDP ) -0.001 0.009 0.542 2030
Interest Expenditure (% of total Expenditure) 0.001 0.014 0.531 1908
 Table 9. Robustness Check 3: Number of Control Variables 
 
 
Note: Reported are estimation results from the EBA regression.  The dependent variable is Baldacci et al. (2011) 
definition of fiscal distress: (i) debt default or restructuring; (ii) sovereign bond yield pressure; (iii) large IMF-
supported program; and (iv) excessive inflation. Estimations are performed using the pooled logit model, with 3 
additional controls per specification. The variables are ranked according to their robustness, with most robust 
indicators placed on top. The sample covers 29 advanced and 52 emerging economies for the period 1970-2015. 
 
Coeff. SE C(0) Obs.
Output Gap 0.333 0.083 1.000 3188
Current Account Balance (% of GDP) -0.054 0.017 0.999 3275
FX Reserves (% of GDP) -0.038 0.014 0.996 3103
FX Reserves Growth -0.011 0.004 0.993 3051
Real GDP Growth -0.045 0.028 0.947 3269
Openness: (M+X)/ GDP -0.006 0.004 0.941 3254
Primary Balance Gap (% of GDP) -0.028 0.019 0.935 688
Overall Fiscal Balance (% of GDP) -0.050 0.038 0.907 2035
Unemployment Rate -0.030 0.025 0.891 2546
CPI Inflation 0.009 0.008 0.858 2804
Primary Balance (% of GDP) -0.045 0.043 0.853 1874
Short Term Debt (% of total) -0.009 0.009 0.849 2107
Gross Financing Need 0.014 0.014 0.842 735
Domestic Credit Gap 0.003 0.003 0.834 2588
Change in Net Claims on Central Government 0.000 0.000 0.786 2415
LIBOR 0.054 0.069 0.785 3670
Concessional Debt (% of total) -0.005 0.007 0.766 1632
FX Reserve Coverage -0.011 0.016 0.761 1581
Debt (% of GDP) -0.003 0.005 0.755 3073
Short Term External Debt (% of GDP) -0.008 0.011 0.754 2142
Real Interest Rate 0.015 0.022 0.753 1387
External Debt (% of GDP) -0.003 0.004 0.746 2475
Foreign Exchange Debt (% of GDP) 0.005 0.007 0.745 1124
Average Maturity -0.024 0.041 0.719 733
Real Exchange Rate Undervaluation -0.003 0.005 0.689 2877
Interest Expenditure (% of total Expenditure) 0.007 0.016 0.660 1908
Interest-Growth Differential -0.004 0.011 0.646 2154
FDI (% of GDP) 0.014 0.038 0.645 2972
Debt owed to Commercial Banks (% of total) -0.008 0.021 0.638 1423
US TBill Rate -0.021 0.062 0.630 3592
Nominal GDP Growth 0.002 0.008 0.600 3046
Debt Service due (% of GDP) -0.006 0.024 0.599 1602
GDP per Capita 0.008 0.043 0.576 3291
Amortisation of Total Public Debt (% of GDP ) -0.002 0.011 0.570 2030
Average Effective Interest Rate 0.000 0.003 0.529 1951
Debt owed to Multilateral Creditors (% of total) -0.001 0.011 0.526 1632
Short Term Debt (% of FX Reserves) 0.000 0.001 0.518 1984
Table 10. Robustness Check 4: Random Effects Logit Model 
 
 
Note: Reported are estimation results from the EBA regression. The dependent variable is Baldacci et al. (2011) 
definition of fiscal distress: (i) debt default or restructuring, (ii) sovereign bond yield pressure, (iii) large IMF-
supported program, and (iv) excessive inflation. Estimations are performed using the random effects logit model, 
with 2 additional controls per specification. The variables are ranked according to their robustness, with most 
robust indicators placed on top. The sample covers 29 advanced and 52 emerging economies for the period 
1970–2015. 
Coeff. SE C(0) Obs.
Output Gap 0.302 0.071 1.000 3188
Current Account Balance (% of GDP) -0.054 0.016 1.000 3275
FX Reserves Growth -0.010 0.003 0.998 3051
FX Reserves (% of GDP) -0.035 0.013 0.997 3103
Real GDP Growth -0.041 0.024 0.960 3269
Primary Balance Gap (% of GDP) -0.029 0.018 0.950 688
Openness: (M+X)/ GDP -0.005 0.003 0.948 3254
Overall Fiscal Balance (% of GDP) -0.055 0.035 0.941 2035
Gross Financing Need 0.019 0.015 0.891 735
Primary Balance (% of GDP) -0.048 0.041 0.879 1874
Change in Net Claims on Central Government 0.000 0.000 0.861 2415
Unemployment Rate -0.025 0.024 0.851 2546
Foreign Exchange Debt (% of GDP) 0.007 0.007 0.833 1124
Short Term Debt (% of total) -0.007 0.008 0.823 2107
LIBOR 0.045 0.050 0.814 3670
FX Reserve Coverage -0.012 0.015 0.779 1581
Concessional Debt (% of total) -0.005 0.006 0.775 1632
CPI Inflation 0.004 0.006 0.771 2804
Real Exchange Rate Undervaluation -0.003 0.004 0.766 2877
Domestic Credit Gap 0.001 0.002 0.757 2588
Real Interest Rate 0.010 0.016 0.735 1387
Short Term External Debt (% of GDP) -0.005 0.008 0.721 2142
Debt (% of GDP) -0.002 0.004 0.702 3073
External Debt (% of GDP) -0.001 0.003 0.682 2475
Average Maturity -0.017 0.043 0.657 733
FDI (% of GDP) 0.012 0.035 0.636 2972
Interest Expenditure (% of total Expenditure) 0.005 0.017 0.617 1908
Debt owed to Commercial Banks (% of total) -0.005 0.016 0.614 1423
US TBill Rate 0.012 0.043 0.612 3592
Amortisation of Total Public Debt (% of GDP ) -0.002 0.009 0.595 2030
Short Term Debt (% of FX Reserves) 0.000 0.001 0.585 1984
Average Effective Interest Rate 0.000 0.003 0.554 1951
Debt Service due (% of GDP) -0.003 0.021 0.551 1602
GDP per Capita -0.003 0.040 0.526 3291
Nominal GDP Growth 0.000 0.006 0.525 3046
Debt owed to Multilateral Creditors (% of total) 0.000 0.010 0.504 1632
Interest-Growth Differential 0.000 0.008 0.503 2154
Table 11. Robustness Check 5: Pooled Probit Model 
 
 
Note: Reported are estimation results from the EBA regression. The dependent variable is Baldacci et al. (2011) 
definition of fiscal distress: (i) debt default or restructuring; (ii) sovereign bond yield pressure; (iii) large IMF-
supported program; and (iv) excessive inflation. Estimations are performed using the pooled probit model, with 2 
additional controls per specification. The variables are ranked according to their robustness, with most robust 
indicators placed on top. The sample covers 29 advanced and 52 emerging economies for the period 1970–2015. 
  
Coeff. SE C(0) Obs.
Output Gap 0.138 0.034 1.000 3188
Current Account Balance (% of GDP) -0.025 0.007 1.000 3275
FX Reserves (% of GDP) -0.016 0.005 0.998 3103
FX Reserves Growth -0.003 0.001 0.995 3051
Primary Balance Gap (% of GDP) -0.018 0.009 0.973 688
Openness: (M+X)/ GDP -0.003 0.001 0.969 3254
Real GDP Growth -0.020 0.011 0.959 3269
Overall Fiscal Balance (% of GDP) -0.026 0.016 0.954 2035
Foreign Exchange Debt (% of GDP) 0.004 0.003 0.909 1124
Primary Balance (% of GDP) -0.023 0.018 0.905 1874
Gross Financing Need 0.008 0.007 0.872 735
Short Term Debt (% of total) -0.004 0.004 0.861 2107
Change in Net Claims on Central Government 0.000 0.000 0.844 2415
Unemployment Rate -0.010 0.010 0.832 2546
LIBOR 0.020 0.024 0.798 3670
CPI Inflation 0.002 0.003 0.798 2804
FX Reserve Coverage -0.007 0.008 0.796 1581
Domestic Credit Gap 0.001 0.001 0.781 2588
Concessional Debt (% of total) -0.002 0.003 0.764 1632
Interest Expenditure (% of total Expenditure) 0.005 0.007 0.764 1908
Short Term External Debt (% of GDP) -0.003 0.004 0.753 2142
Real Interest Rate 0.005 0.008 0.742 1387
Real Exchange Rate Undervaluation -0.001 0.002 0.741 2877
Debt (% of GDP) -0.001 0.002 0.735 3073
External Debt (% of GDP) -0.001 0.001 0.717 2475
Average Maturity -0.010 0.020 0.700 733
FDI (% of GDP) 0.005 0.016 0.633 2972
Amortisation of Total Public Debt (% of GDP ) -0.001 0.004 0.626 2030
Debt owed to Commercial Banks (% of total) -0.002 0.008 0.618 1423
US TBill Rate 0.004 0.020 0.585 3592
Nominal GDP Growth 0.001 0.003 0.581 3046
Short Term Debt (% of FX Reserves) 0.000 0.000 0.576 1984
GDP per Capita -0.003 0.017 0.570 3291
Debt Service due (% of GDP) -0.001 0.010 0.555 1602
Debt owed to Multilateral Creditors (% of total) 0.001 0.005 0.544 1632
Interest-Growth Differential 0.000 0.004 0.542 2154
Average Effective Interest Rate 0.000 0.001 0.520 1951
Table 12. Robustness Check 6: Using New Measure of Output Gap 
 
 
Note: Reported are estimation results from the EBA regression. The dependent variable is Baldacci et al. (2011) 
definition of fiscal distress: (i) debt default or restructuring; (ii) sovereign bond yield pressure; (iii) large IMF-
supported program; and (iv) excessive inflation. Estimations are performed using the pooled Logit model, with 2 
additional controls per specification. The output gap is generated using a one-sided Christiano-Fitzgerald filter. 
The variables are ranked according to their robustness, with most robust indicators placed on top. The sample 
covers 29 advanced and 52 emerging economies for the period 1970-2015. 
Coeff. SE C(0) Obs.
Output Gap 0.074 0.018 1.000 3188
Current Account Balance (% of GDP) -0.025 0.007 1.000 3275
FX Reserves (% of GDP) -0.016 0.005 0.998 3103
FX Reserves Growth -0.003 0.001 0.995 3051
Primary Balance Gap (% of GDP) -0.018 0.009 0.971 688
Openness: (M+X)/ GDP -0.003 0.001 0.967 3254
Real GDP Growth -0.019 0.011 0.954 3269
Overall Fiscal Balance (% of GDP) -0.026 0.016 0.953 2035
Foreign Exchange Debt (% of GDP) 0.004 0.003 0.907 1124
Primary Balance (% of GDP) -0.023 0.018 0.904 1874
Gross Financing Need 0.008 0.007 0.873 735
Short Term Debt (% of total) -0.004 0.004 0.859 2107
Change in Net Claims on Central Government 0.000 0.000 0.843 2415
Unemployment Rate -0.010 0.010 0.835 2546
LIBOR 0.020 0.024 0.800 3670
FX Reserve Coverage -0.007 0.008 0.797 1581
CPI Inflation 0.002 0.003 0.797 2804
Domestic Credit Gap 0.001 0.001 0.781 2588
Interest Expenditure (% of total Expenditure) 0.005 0.007 0.767 1908
Concessional Debt (% of total) -0.002 0.003 0.766 1632
Short Term External Debt (% of GDP) -0.003 0.004 0.753 2142
Real Exchange Rate Undervaluation -0.001 0.002 0.744 2877
Real Interest Rate 0.005 0.008 0.738 1387
Debt (% of GDP) -0.001 0.002 0.732 3073
External Debt (% of GDP) -0.001 0.001 0.716 2475
Average Maturity -0.010 0.020 0.695 733
FDI (% of GDP) 0.006 0.016 0.639 2972
Amortisation of Total Public Debt (% of GDP ) -0.001 0.004 0.628 2030
Debt owed to Commercial Banks (% of total) -0.002 0.008 0.613 1423
US TBill Rate 0.005 0.020 0.589 3592
Nominal GDP Growth 0.001 0.003 0.581 3046
Short Term Debt (% of FX Reserves) 0.000 0.000 0.575 1984
GDP per Capita -0.003 0.017 0.569 3291
Debt Service due (% of GDP) -0.001 0.010 0.556 1602
Debt owed to Multilateral Creditors (% of total) 0.001 0.005 0.543 1632
Interest-Growth Differential 0.000 0.004 0.539 2154
Average Effective Interest Rate 0.000 0.001 0.522 1951
Table 13. Early Warning System Based on Most Robust Leading Indicators 
 
 
Note: Reported are estimation results from the pooled logit model using most robust leading indicators of fiscal 
distress. The dependent variable is Baldacci et al. (2011) definition of fiscal distress: (i) debt default or 
restructuring; (ii) sovereign bond yield pressure; (iii) large IMF-supported program; and (iv) excessive inflation. The 
sample covers 29 advanced and 52 emerging economies for the period 1970–2015. AUROC is the area under the 
receiver operating curve. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pooled logit
Output Gap 0.4377***
[0.0860]
Current Account Balance (% of GDP) -0.0943***
[0.0196]
FX Reserves Growth 0.0002
[0.0029]
Openness: (M+X)/ GDP -0.0097***
[0.0035]
Real GDP Growth -0.1312***
[0.0349]
Overall Fiscal Balance (% of GDP) -0.0030
[0.0407]
Primary Balance (% of GDP) -0.0078
[0.0439]
Intercept -1.9855***
[0.3069]
Number of observations 1765
Pseudo R^2 0.537
AUROC 0.815
Type 1 error 0.218
Type 2 error 0.312
TME 0.530
Figure 1. Banking, Currency and Fiscal Crises 
 
 
Note: Reported is the overlap between fiscal, banking and currency crises for the period 1970–2010. Data on 
banking and currency crisis episodes are taken from Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). Data on the first year of a fiscal 
crisis are from Baldacci et al. (2011). 
Figure 2. Event Study Analysis 
 
Note: Both graphs as generated using the Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012) event study methodology. It shows the 
percent deviation of the debt to GDP ratio and the current account balance to GDP ratio from their respective 
"tranquil" averages. This is defined as the average level of the respective variable outside the 3-year window 
around the crisis incident. Dotted lines denote the 10% confidence intervals.    
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Figure 3. Fiscal Distress Index Based on Robust Leading Indicators 
 
 
Note: The fiscal distress index is generated by using predicted values from the logit model that includes most 
robust leading indicators. The most robust leading indicators are defined as those with at least 90 percent 
probability of not switching signs using the EBA results. Robust leading indicators include (i) Output Gap; (ii) 
Current Account Balance (% of GDP); (iii) FX Reserves Growth; (iv) Openness: (M+X)/GDP; (v) Real GDP Growth, (vi) 
Overall Fiscal Balance (% of GDP); (vii) Primary Balance (% of GDP). Blue line indicates the Fiscal Distress Index (left 
axis). Dotted lines indicate 90 percent confidence bands around predicted values. Orange line represents the 
absolute number of distress events in a given year (right axis). Data are missing for the pre-1980 period so that 
no predictive values can be generated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. In-sample Performance: EBA-based Fiscal Distress Index versus Baldacci et al. 
(2011) Index 
 
 
Note: Reported is the Total Misclassification Error (TME) for different threshold levels. The blue line represents the 
baseline model based on robust leading indicators: (i) output gap; (ii) current account balance (% of GDP); (iii) FX 
reserves growth; (iv) openness: (M+X)/GDP; (v) real GDP growth; (vi) overall fiscal balance (% of GDP); (vii) primary 
balance (% of GDP). The vertical line marks the threshold level (0.07) that minimizes the TME. The orange line 
represents TME from the model based on variables used by Baldacci et al. (2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. In-sample Versus Out-of-sample Performance of the EBA-based Fiscal Distress 
Index 
 
 
Note: Reported is The Total Misclassification Error (TME) for different levels of the threshold. The fiscal 
vulnerability index is based on robust leading indicators: (i) output gap; (ii) current account balance (% of GDP), 
(iii) FX reserves growth; (iv) openness: (M+X)/GDP; (v) real GDP growth; (vi) overall fiscal balance (% of GDP); (vii) 
primary balance (% of GDP). The blue line represents the in-sample TME based on the years 1970–2007. The 
orange line represents the out-of-sample TME for the years 2008–2015. The vertical line marks the threshold level 
(0.04) that minimizes the in-sample TME. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 6. Classification Table for Out-of-sample Predictions of the EBA-based Fiscal 
Distress Indicator 
 
 
 
Note: Reported is the model classification for the years 2008–2015. A signal is issued if fiscal distress index 
exceeds the threshold derived from the in-sample minimization of the TME.   
 
 Figure 7. Comparison with Other Studies 
 
 
Note: Reported is the in-sample total misclassification error (TME), Type1 and Type2 errors of 8 Early Warning 
Systems for currency, banking and sovereign crises reported in the literature. The values represent the minimum, 
the 25th percentile, the mean, the 75th percentile and the maximum.   
 
 
Yes No Total
Yes 25 118 143
No 7 226 233
Total 32 344 376
Crisis
Si
gn
al
 Figure 8. Economic Significance of Robust Leading Indicators 
 
 
Note: Reported is the difference in the logarithm of the odds ratio calculated for 75th and 25th percentile of each 
leading indicator (components of the fiscal distress index). A larger absolute value indicates a larger economic 
impact of a change in that indicator on the log odds ratio of a fiscal distress. 
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